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I. INTRODUCTION 
As thoughtfully noted by a prominent scholar in the field of 
supranational uniform commercial law: 
These are not happy days for international commercial law. The anti-protectionist 
winds that started to blow in Bretton Woods back in 1945 have lost by now much 
of their vigour. With that, vast sectors of public opinion are no longer convinced 
that free commerce and multilateral economic cooperation at a global or regional 
level are a powerful factor of peace and prosperity.1 
Free commerce and multilateral economic cooperation have long played the 
role of economic premises and theoretical underpinnings of the international 
unification of private and commercial law and have consistently been 
invoked as justification for the efforts put into the legislative unification of 
contract law. The Preamble to the 1980 United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (hereinafter “CISG” or 
“Convention”) is an exemplary acknowledgment of the foregoing, in that, 
after referring to the objectives set forth in the resolutions adopted by the 
sixth special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on the 
establishment of a “New International Economic Order,”2 it states explicitly 
that the States parties to the CISG adopted the Convention: 
Considering that the development of international trade on the basis of equality 
and mutual benefit is an important element in promoting friendly relations among 
States, [and] 
Being of the opinion that the adoption of uniform rules which govern contracts for 
the international sale of goods and take into account the different social, economic 
and legal systems would contribute to the removal of legal barriers in international 
trade and promote the development of international trade.3 
The current political trend, however, seems to be moving toward the 
emergence of a form of neo-souvereinism, characterized by a focus on purely 
national interests, skepticism toward multilateral economic cooperation and 
                                                                                                                           
 
1 Alberto Mazzoni, President, Int’l Inst. for the Unification of Private Law, International 
Commercial Law Today: Old Habits and New Challenges (Sept. 14, 2017), in 32 DIR. COMM. INT. 829, 
829 (2018). 
2 See G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic 
Order (May 1, 1974). 
3 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods, pmbl. Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISG]. 
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a marked inclination toward using trade wars (i.e., tariffs, import restrictions 
and the like) in international relations. 
An indirect confirmation of the loss of appeal of multilateral cooperation 
in international commercial law may be drawn from the decrease in attention 
paid by uniform-law-making agencies to the drafting of international uniform 
commercial law conventions. 
Unlike the phase that followed the (successful) adoption of the CISG, 
when several other initiatives were promoted with the view to creating a web 
of international uniform contract law conventions,4 in recent times the 
attention has shifted to soft law instruments, such as the UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts,5 the (2000) UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide on Privately Financed Infrastructure Project,6 the (2007) 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions,7 the (2008) 
UNIDROIT Model Law on Leasing,8 the (2011) UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Public Procurement,9 the (2015) UNIDROIT-FAO-IFAD Legal Guide on 
Contract Farming10 and the (2017) UNCITRAL Model Law on Secured 
Transactions: Guide to Enactment,11 just to mention a few. 
All in all, it is apparent that uniform-law-making agencies have shifted 
their attention to soft law instruments, which by definition are more flexible 
and adaptable instruments, yet lacking the enforceability and (possibly) 
normativity of hard law ones, as they express the aspiration toward their 
                                                                                                                           
 
4 For further references on the impact of the CISG on subsequent uniform law conventions, see 
MARCO TORSELLO, COMMON FEATURES OF UNIFORM COMMERCIAL LAW CONVENTIONS: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY BEYOND THE 1980 UNIFORM SALES LAW (2004). 
5 Int’l Inst. for the Unification of Private Law [UNIDROIT], UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts (4th ed. 2016), https://www.unidroit.org/instruments/commercial-contracts/ 
unidroit-principles-201 [hereinafter PICC]. 
6 U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW [UNCITRAL], LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON PRIVATELY 
FINANCED INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS, U.N. Sales No. E.01.V.4 (2001). 
7 U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW [UNCITRAL], LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON SECURED 
TRANSACTIONS, U.N. Sales No. E.09.V.12 (2010). 
8 Int’l Inst. for the Unification of Private Law [UNIDROIT], UNIDROIT Model Law on Leasing 
(2008), https://www.unidroit.org/english/documents/2008/study59a/s-59a-17-e.pdf. 
9 U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW [UNCITRAL], UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON PUBLIC 
PROCUREMENT, U.N. Doc. A/66/17, U.N. Sales No. E.14.V.1 (2011). 
10 Int’l Inst. for the Unification of Private Law [UNIDROIT] et al., UNIDROT/FAO/IFAD Legal 
Guide on Contract Farming (2015), https://www.unidroit.org/english/guides/2015contractfarming/cf-
guide-2015-e.pdf. 
11 U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW [UNCITRAL], UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON SECURED 
TRANSACTIONS: GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, U.N. Doc. A/71/17 (2017). 
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progressive transformation into hard law, whether in the form of domestic 
statutes (which may be regarded as the hard-law target of model laws) or in 
the form of supranational usages (which may be regarded as the main form 
of consolidation into law of collections of principles).12 
The shift from the production of hard law legislative instruments in the 
form of treaties and conventions to that of soft law instruments, in the form 
of principles, codes of conduct, model laws, legal guides and the like, could 
be understood as the acknowledgment of the fact that more ambitious 
projects, aimed at the creation of hard law uniform instruments are doomed 
to fail. In fact, many examples may be put forward in support of this 
conclusion, offering a long list of conventions adopted after the CISG, which 
never reached the minimum number of ratifications necessary for their entry 
into force,13 or which barely made it to enter into force, but are applicable 
only in very few States and almost never applied in practice.14 
With all this in mind, the observer turning back to the CISG is faced 
with a relevant interpretative question. Although the degree of success may 
be questioned on the grounds that parties often opt-out of the Convention,15 
it is undeniable that the CISG is a significant example of a successful 
                                                                                                                           
 
12 For an analysis of soft law, its genealogy and characters, and further bibliography, see Marco 
Torsello, Storing Clouds in a Jar: Lex Mercatoria, Soft Law and Codification in Transnational 
Commercial Law, 7 EUROP. INT’L ARB. REV. 101 (2018). 
13 Examples of Conventions that never entered into force include the (1983) UNIDROIT 
Convention on Agency in the International Sale of Goods, adopted in Geneva on February 17, 1983; the 
(1988) United Nations Convention on International Bills of Exchange and International Promissory Notes; 
the (1991) United Nations Convention on the Liability of Operators of Transport Terminals in 
International Trade; the (2001) United Nations Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in 
International Trade; and the (2009) UNIDROIT Convention on Substantive Rules for Intermediated 
Securities. 
14 Examples of Conventions that have formally entered into force but are rarely applied in practice 
include the (1988) UNIDROIT Conventions on International Factoring and International Financial 
Leasing, both adopted in Ottawa on May 28, 1988, which are both in force in France, Hungary, Italy, 
Latvia, Nigeria, Russian Federation, and Ukraine, while the Factoring Convention is also in force in 
Belgium and Germany and the Financial Leasing Convention is also in force in Belarus, Panama and 
Uzbekistan; the (1995) United Nations Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of 
Credit, which is in force only in Belarus, Ecuador, El Salvador, Gabon, Kuwait, Liberia, Panama, and 
Tunisia; the (2005) United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International 
Contracts, which is in force only in Azerbaijan, Cameroon, Congo, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Honduras, 
Montenegro, Paraguay, Russian Federation, Singapore, and Sri Lanka. 
15 Statistical data on parties opting-out of the CISG are still not entirely clear, given the difficulty 
of assessing whether, for instance, the lack of a contractual choice of law, or the choice of the law of a 
contracting State, leading to application of the CISG, results from the mere failure to consider the issue 
of the applicability of the Convention, or is an implicit expression of consent to its application. Other 
papers in this same issue of the J.L. & COMM. address this aspect in greater detail. 
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convention, at least from the standpoint of the number of contracting States, 
in a general context of multiple failures and of growing generalized 
skepticism toward the international unification of commercial law through 
legislative instruments. The question thus arises whether, in the interpretation 
and application of the CISG, the context should at all be considered and, if 
so, whether it should lead to a restrictive interpretation of the Convention in 
light of an alleged generalized disfavor toward the legislative unification of 
commercial law, or, to the contrary, support a more expansive interpretation 
and application of the CISG in light of the fact that other international 
uniform commercial law conventions are unlikely to become available to 
business operators in the near future. 
This Paper will proceed as follows: Section II will focus on the 
implications of the contextual interpretation of the CISG and will introduce 
the discussion on the applicability of the CISG to non-sales transactions. The 
section will then comment on Section II.A. the possibility of an interpretative 
extension of the CISG beyond what are typically qualified as sales contracts 
and Section II.B. the possibility to apply the CISG as a source of general 
principles of international contract law in cases where the Convention would 
not per se be applicable. Section III will then offer a practical overview of 
applications of the CISG to non-sales transactions by focusing, in particular, 
on countertrade and barter transactions. Section IV will draw some 
conclusions. 
II. APPLICABILITY OF THE CISG TO NON-SALES TRANSACTIONS: 
CONTEXTUAL INTERPRETATION OF THE CISG AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
Although the literal interpretation of its text should be the starting point 
for the interpretation of the Convention,16 the fact that the context should also 
be taken into consideration seems to be confirmed by the reference contained 
in Article 7 of the CISG to the “international character” of the Convention 
for the purpose of its interpretation.17 However, what weight, if any, should 
be given to the (presumptively) prevailing political waves, which tend by 
nature to ebb and flow as time goes by, is a more troublesome question. In 
fact, no answer to that question may be drawn from the other interpretative 
                                                                                                                           
 
16 Sieg Eiselen, Literal Interpretation: The Meaning of the Words, in CISG METHODOLOGY 61 
(Andre Janssen & Olaf Meyer eds., 2009). 
17 Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 687 (1998). 
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criteria set forth in Article 7 of the CISG. Both the “need to promote 
uniformity” in the application of the Convention and the need to promote 
“good faith in international trade” are, in principle, compatible with either a 
restrictive or an expansive interpretation of the Convention. Additionally, 
this does not provide guidance as to the relevance to be attributed to political 
trends and attitudes. It seems, instead, more convincing to posit that the 
“international character” of the CISG requires the interpreter to take into 
account the context in which the Convention is applied, thus giving weight, 
directly or indirectly, to the socio-political situation—to the same extent, for 
instance, the socio-political context has an inevitable (although indirect) 
impact on the notion of public policy relevant to a conflict-of-laws or 
judgment recognition analysis. 
The conclusion that the socio-political context should be taken into 
account when interpreting the CISG, however, does not per se support any 
specific conclusion as to what type of implications the current socio-political 
context should entail. In fact, it is posited here that the current socio-political 
context of emerging neo-souverainisme does not imply, nor does it require, 
a restrictive interpretation of the CISG, whereas the analysis of the needs and 
demands of commercial operators and the stalemate in the process of 
international unification of commercial law through conventions may 
support the opposite conclusion that an expansive interpretation and 
application of the Convention is appropriate. 
Indeed, the emerging wave of neo-souverainisme cannot contradict the 
position that supports the benefits of the international unification of 
substantive commercial law. Unification eliminates legal barriers between 
legal systems by creating a “common bridge” between different 
jurisdictions.18 As spelled out in the Preamble of the CISG and of most other 
uniform law conventions, the adoption of uniform rules, by removing legal 
barriers, promotes the development of international trade in that it reduces 
uncertainty and unpredictability as to the applicable law.19 In turn, the 
reduction of uncertainty and unpredictability reduces the costs and risks 
involved in any international transaction. On the other hand, the CISG 
contains only supplemental, default rules, which may be derogated from or 
                                                                                                                           
 
18 Peter M. Gerhart, The Sales Convention in Courts: Uniformity, Adaptability and Adoptability, in 
THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS REVISITED 77, 79 (P. Šarčević & P. Volken eds., 2001). 
19 CISG, supra note 3, at pmbl.; see also René David, The International Unification of Private Law, 
in 2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 212 (1969). 
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entirely excluded by the parties under Article 6 of the CISG, whereas the 
“validity exception” under Article 4 of the CISG is conceived so as to let the 
uniform text give way to domestic law whenever public policy concerns are 
at stake. 
Furthermore, in light of the foregoing considerations, it seems correct to 
affirm that the unification of substantive law is to be preferred over the 
unification of private international law.20 Indeed, whether the private 
international law rules applicable in a given case are uniform ones or 
domestic ones, it is apparent that private international law requires a two-step 
process in order to determine the rules governing an international transaction. 
First, the private international law rule applicable to the transaction must be 
identified; second, the applicable domestic substantive rule applicable by 
virtue of the releveant private interiational law provision must be interpreted 
and applied.21 Even if one did not consider either the intrinsic difficulties and 
uncertainties involved in the concrete application of the private international 
law approach, or those accompanying the interpretation and application of 
the foreign substantive law when the forum’s private international law rules 
dictate application of foreign law, one would still acknowledge the much 
lower complexity of the process when uniform substantive law is applied 
“directly.” In fact, uniform substantive law directly provides for the rules 
governing the international transaction, thus making identification of the law 
governing the transaction a single-step process. Hence, if one assumes that 
the costs and risks involved in the interpretation and application of both the 
uniform and domestic substantive rules are equal, one must conclude that the 
costs and risks involved in the private international law’s two-step process 
are higher, the difference being those associated with the additional 
preliminary step (i.e., the identification of the private international law rule 
applicable to the case at hand). 
As far as the methods of unification are concerned, as already remarked, 
it is undeniable that in recent years the attention has largely shifted from 
legislative unification through conventions to principles-based unification 
                                                                                                                           
 
20 See Franco Ferrari, CISG and Private International Law, THE 1980 UNIFORM SALES LAW: OLD 
ISSUES REVISITED IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT EXPERIENCES 20 (F. Ferrari ed., 2003). 
21 For a similar analysis in case law, see Tribunale [District Court] di Vigevano, Italy, 12 luglio 
2000 (It.), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000712i3.html. 
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instruments in the form of soft law.22 While this can be seen as an indication 
of skepticism toward legislative unification, it is posited here that the 
difficulties arose primarily as a result of the specific, very time-consuming 
and burdensome process of law-making by virtue of an international treaty, 
to be first agreed upon at the international level, and then accepted and 
adopted at the level of the individual contracting states.23 The risk of 
investing considerable energy, time and resources on international 
conventions that might never come into force has understandably led 
international law-making agencies, such as UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT, to 
invest more on soft law instruments, as the basis of a more flexible approach 
toward unification of commercial law, which results in the immediate 
availability of the instrument among the sources of international commercial 
law (although with limited enforceability), without prejudice to the possible 
future transformation thereof in a hard law treaty or convention. 
On the other hand, the shift from unification of commercial law through 
conventions to unification through soft law instruments confirms the need for 
the unification of international commercial law, while suggesting that the 
methods of unification deserve careful reconsideration. The foregoing 
comment may also be deemed relevant from a different perspective. Soft law 
instruments are primarily meant to be sources of rules to be incorporated by 
reference by the parties in their contract, or to be applied on the basis of their 
persuasive force as expression of general principles of commercial law. In 
the latter case, national courts or (more often) arbitral tribunals may look at 
soft law instruments as persuasive sources of law to be weighed against each 
other, as well as against sources of hard law, including national domestic 
laws and international conventions, irrespective of whether or not they are 
per se applicable in the case at hand. Therefore, not only does the shift from 
legislative unification to principles-based unification not support the 
conclusion that the CISG and other international uniform commercial law 
conventions should be given a more limited weight in the resolution of 
international commercial disputes, but, to the contrary, the increasing resort 
to soft law instruments as persuasive sources of law in the adjudication of 
                                                                                                                           
 
22 See Jürgen Basedow, International Economic Law and Commercial Contracts: Promoting 
Cross-Border Trade by Uniform Law Conventions, 23 UNIFORM L. REV. 1 (2018) (supporting 
international unification). 
23 See KATHARINA BOELE-WOELKI, UNIFYING AND HARMONISING SUBSTANTIVE LAW AND THE 
ROLE OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 64 (2010). 
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international disputes offers an additional approach, possibly leading to the 
application of the CISG in cases where it would not per se be applicable. 
Against this backdrop, critiques on the benefits of the international 
unification of commercial law have typically focused on three aspects, none 
of which appear convincing. 
The first critique stresses the genesis of uniform law conventions, which 
is the result of a compromise between competing legal cultures and interests, 
often reached to the detriment of the quality of the rules set forth in the 
convention in question,24 thus increasing the impact of inefficient rules. 
However, arguments focusing on the quality of the final text of a uniform 
law convention, as relevant as they may be, appear to be misleading with 
respect to the issue at stake. Indeed, on the one hand, any new piece of 
legislation, even at the national level, brings about changes that, in a 
democratic legislative process, are largely the result of a compromise 
between (at the very least) competing interests and divergent social, political 
and cultural perspectives. On the other hand, arguments focusing on the 
purported inferior quality of the rules set forth in international conventions 
are misleading, as they do not consider uniform laws themselves, but rather 
the process of creating uniform law. It is certainly true that an inefficient 
uniform law increases the impact of inefficient rules, as it is true that a good 
uniform law increases the impact of efficient rules. In this respect, the 
question as to whether the methods that are, thus far, adopted to produce 
uniform law are appropriate is, beyond doubt, a crucial one. However, it is 
apparent that the debate about the intrinsic qualities of the legislative model 
to be adopted at the international level stands separate from the debate 
surrounding the advantages of uniform law vis-à-vis the traditional private 
international law approach. 
The second critique to uniform law stresses the relational profile: 
uniform law reduces pluralism, cultural diversity and competition among 
legal systems,25 thus hindering the possibility of developing and improving 
the law, and of adapting it to new circumstances on the basis of other legal 
systems’ experience and expertise. This criticism may sound appealing to 
                                                                                                                           
 
24 See, e.g., Barry Nicholas, The United Kingdom and the Vienna Sales Convention: Another Case 
of Splendid Isolation?, Address at Centro di Studi e Ricerche di Diritto Comparato e Straniero 3ff. (March 
1993), https://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/nicholas3.html. 
25 See, e.g., Pierre Legrand, Counterpoint: Law is Also Culture, in THE UNIFICATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL CONTRACT LAW 245 (Franco Ferrari ed., 1998). 
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supporters of neo-souverainiste positions in light of its focus on the alleged 
protection of local cultural identities. However, this argument is 
unconvincing, in that it fails to take into due consideration the unification 
technique that is being adopted in the CISG and most other uniform law 
conventions. In particular, the argument seems to overlook the fact that the 
need for harmonized rules reflects the need for certainty and predictability of 
business operators. In this context, uniform law conventions make a 
distinction, which is relevant as to the instrument’s sphere of application, 
between domestic and international transactions. The distinction is of great 
relevance, since only those transactions which qualify as international ones 
are governed by the uniform rules. It follows from this “two-tier” approach 
that uniform law does not displace domestic law regarding the transactions 
that fall outside the conventions’ sphere of application. In this respect, the 
benefits of competition among different legal systems and those of legal 
diversity would seem to be better served by legislative unification of 
international commercial law, which pursues the reconciliation of different 
legal traditions,26 rather than by other “spontaneous,” yet less visible, forms 
of harmonization of the law, which often lead to the mere transplant of legal 
rules from more economically influential jurisdictions to other, less 
influential, ones. Furthermore, it is also relevant to recall that in the CISG 
and most other uniform commercial law conventions, the parties can exclude 
any applicable convention in its entirety and submit the transaction to the law 
of any specific jurisdiction, thus preserving the valuable mechanism of 
regulatory competition between legal systems. 
The third critique to the legislative unification of commercial law 
stresses the operational profile of uniform law. Uniform law produces new 
rules which business operators and national courts are, most likely, not 
familiar with.27 The “novelty” brought by a new Convention may thus lead 
to uncertainty as to how the uniform rules will be concretely implemented by 
the decentralized national courts that will be applying the Convention, 
resulting in additional transaction costs and “learning externalities.” 
Although the difficulties arising from the “novelty” of uniform law 
conventions are undeniable, the long experience acquired with the CISG and 
with the promotion of its uniform interpretation now supports the conclusion 
                                                                                                                           
 
26 See Alejandro Garro, Reconciliation of Legal Traditions in the U.N. Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods, 23 INT’L L. 443 (1989). 
27 See Steven Walt, Novelty and the Risks of Uniform Sales Law, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 671, 672 (1999). 
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that this criticism is ill-grounded. It is now common knowledge, and a 
broadly accepted interpretative approach, that the decentralized national 
courts called upon to apply the CISG must take into account its international 
character, which in turn requires the courts to take into account the pre-
existing international case law, not only in the jurisdiction of the adjudicating 
court, but also in other jurisdictions. 
With the above caveats, it is confirmed that courts called upon to apply 
the Convention should construe the uniform text in the light of the broader 
context which the Convention is apart. In particular, in interpreting the CISG 
“regard is to be had to its international character and to the need to promote 
uniformity.” “Uniformity” represents the ultimate goal of the interpretative 
process, enhancing the autonomous interpretation of the Convention, which 
must therefore be conducted irrespective of any domestic notion.28 However, 
while the ultimate goal of uniformity contributes little to the positive 
definition of the interpretive methodology to be adopted, the required regard 
to the “international character” seems a more fertile criterion.29 The criterion 
at hand is of interest to those seeking positive methodological guidelines, not 
only because it imposes regard to court decisions irrespective of the location 
of the forum, but also because it suggests that there is an international context 
to consider, within which the Convention stands. 
This argument does not overlook the fact that the interpretation of any 
uniform law convention must move from the text of the international 
instrument itself, and primarily search for the intention of its drafters.30 On 
the contrary, it emphasizes the intention of the drafters by attempting to 
demonstrate that the drafters themselves took the international context into 
consideration, and in the text of any convention largely sought for solutions 
which either were coherently in line with those adopted in previous 
instruments, or were aimed at overcoming problems and inconsistencies 
which had emerged in the application of previous instruments. 
Therefore, the CISG cannot be treated as a monad living its own life in 
the universe of international business transactions. The very fact that the 
CISG is not an exhaustive instrument and that it contemplates, and even 
                                                                                                                           
 
28 See Franco Ferrari, Homeward Trend: What, Why and Why Not, 9 INTERNATIONALES 
HANDELSCRECHT 8 (2009). 
29 For a similar distinction between the two criteria, see Gerhart, supra note 18, at 81–82. 
30 See Gary F. Bell, Taking the Languages of the CISG Seriously, in PRIVATE LAW, NATIONAL—
GLOBAL—COMPARATIVE 143 (Andrea Büchler & Markus Müller-Chen eds., 2011). 
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requires, resort to external sources (namely, the domestic law applicable by 
virtue of the private international law rules of the forum) suggests that the 
Convention is meant to be interpreted and applied in conjunction with other 
sources of commercial law. Whether directly or indirectly, the context affects 
the way in which the Convention is interpreted and applied in practice. 
It is argued here that the foregoing has relevant implications, not only 
with respect to the way in which relevant notions contained in the CISG are 
to be interpreted (including the notion of “sale” that is critical to describe the 
Convention’s sphere of application ratione materiae), but also in respect of 
the possible application of the CISG beyond its temporal or geographical 
sphere of application, in cases where the CISG would not per se be 
applicable, but can nonetheless be applied as an expression of general 
principles of international contract law. 
A. The Interpretative Extension of the CISG’s Sphere of Application 
Ratione Materiae Beyond Sales Contracts: Notion of “Sale,” Mixed 
Contracts and More 
Keeping in mind the ultimate goal of uniformity in the interpretative 
process and the need to consider the international character of the 
Convention, it seems correct to conclude that the interpretation of the CISG 
should favor the adoption of notions and solutions that promote the adoption 
of a common solution, rather than notions and solutions drawn from the 
domestic legal systems of the contracting states involved. 
The foregoing is confirmed, for instance, by the largely prevailing view 
about the way in which the validity exception under Article 4 of the CISG 
must be interpreted. In most domestic legal systems issues such as fraud, 
mistake and misrepresentation are issues concerning the validity of a 
contract. However, this is not, in itself, sufficient to conclude that domestic 
law—and not the CISG—applies whenever an issue of this kind arises.31 To 
determine the pre-emption or concurrence of CISG’s and domestic law’s 
remedies and defenses, it is necessary to determine the scope of the so-called 
                                                                                                                           
 
31 Cf. Patrick C. Leyens, CISG and Mistake: Uniform Law vs. Domestic Law: The Interpretative 
Challenge of Mistake and the Validity Loophole, in REVIEW OF THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR 
THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 3 (Pace Int’l Law Review ed., 2005). 
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“validity exception” laid down in Article 4(a) of the CISG.32 Scholarly 
writings and court decisions agree that the meaning of “validity” in Article 
4(a) of the CISG must not be construed in light of domestic law, but rather 
in line with Article 7(1) of the CISG (i.e. in an autonomous and uniform 
fashion).33 Therefore, validity issues pursuant to Article 4(a) are only those 
that are not dealt with—explicitly or implicitly—under the CISG, as 
confirmed by the carve-out “except as otherwise expressly provided in this 
Convention” contained in the chapeau of Article 4.34 In other words, for a 
resort to domestic law to be admitted, there must be no solution to a given 
problem that can be derived from the CISG. Accordingly, where, in relation 
to a specific set of facts, the CISG provides solutions that are exhaustive and 
functionally equivalent to the otherwise applicable domestic remedies, the 
CISG pre-empts recourse to those domestic remedies, independent of any 
domestic labelling of the specific issue. In practice, this means that once a 
court or arbitral tribunal is confronted with an issue of “validity” as 
autonomously defined under the CISG, the court or arbitral tribunal has to 
identify the domestic law applicable to the contract and determine whether 
domestic remedies or defenses are available to the parties in the specific case. 
The court or arbitral tribunal then has to look into whether the CISG makes 
available solutions that are functionally equivalent to the domestic law 
remedies and defenses available to the parties. If so, the CISG pre-empts the 
corresponding domestic remedies and defenses. Where no functionally 
equivalent solutions are available under the CISG, the domestic law 
determines what remedies and defenses the parties can rely on in concreto. 
If (1) domestic law is admitted solely because no solution to a given 
problem can be derived from the CISG and (2) the ultimate goal of the CISG 
is to promote uniformity by limiting the resort to domestic law, then 
interpretation of the CISG should favor a construction that broadens the 
                                                                                                                           
 
32 Franco Ferrari, The Interaction Between the United Nations Conventions on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods and Domestic Remedies (Rescission for Mistake and Remedies in Tort Law), 
RABEL J. COMP. & INT’L PRIV. L. 52, 65–67 (2007). 
33 Ulrich G. Schroeter, Defining the Borders of Uniform International Contract Law: The CISG 
and Remedies for Innocent, Negligent, or Fraudulent Misrepresentation, 58 VILL. L. REV. 553, 557–58, 
563 (2014); PETER HUBER & ALASTAIR MULLIS, THE CISG: A NEW TEXTBOOK FOR STUDENTS AND 
PRACTITIONERS 21, 23 (2007); Ferrari, supra note 32, at 63–64, 67. 
34 Milena Djordjević, Article 4, in UN CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL 
SALE OF GOODS (CISG): A COMMENTARY 63 (Stefan Kröll et al. eds., 2011); HUBER & MULLIS, supra 
note 33, at 23. 
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Convention’s sphere of application ratione materiae, thus limiting resort to 
domestic law. 
The foregoing interpretative guideline should apply, in the first place, to 
the notion of a sale. In fact, the sphere of application ratione materiae of the 
CISG seems to be limited, by definition, to contracts for the sale of goods, 
although the Convention does not require the parties to label their contract as 
such.35 The first question to be dealt with, therefore, is what constitutes a 
“sale.”36 The CISG, does not define the sales contract.37 However, it does not 
make it impossible to define “sales contract” autonomously under the 
Convention.38 A definition of “sales contract” can be inferred from Articles 
30 and 53,39 the provisions laying down the obligations of the parties to a 
sales contract governed by the CISG. Thus, independent from the civil or 
commercial character of the parties or of the contract itself (Article 1(3)), the 
“sales contract” can be defined as the contract “pursuant to which one 
party—the seller—is bound to deliver the goods and transfer the property in 
the goods sold and the other party—the buyer—is obliged to pay the price 
and accept the goods.”40 Accordingly, the essence of the sales contract lies in 
goods being exchanged for a price. 
However, the sales contract as defined above, is not the only type of 
contract governed by the CISG. Contracts modifying an international sales 
contract also fall under the CISG’s sphere of application, since they directly 
affect the rights and obligations of the parties to the international sales 
contract. Similarly, the agreement to conclude a contract for the international 
sale of goods subject to the CISG can also be governed by the CISG. 
Contracts for the delivery of goods by installments are also governed by the 
                                                                                                                           
 
35 Foreign Trade Court of Arbitration, Serbian Chamber of Commerce, July 15, 2008, http:// 
cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/080715sb.html. 
36 See CLAYTON P. GILLETTE & STEVEN D. WALT, THE UN CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE 
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 43 (2d ed. 2016). 
37 See RB Midden-Nederland (Netherlands), Mar. 25, 2015, http://www.globalsaleslaw.org/ 
content/api/cisg/display.cfm?test=2591; Tribunale [District Court] di Forli, 6 marzo 2012, http://www 
.globalsaleslaw.org/content/api/cisg/urteile/2585.pdf. 
38 See Martini E Ricci Iamino—Consortile Societa Agricola, an Italian Co. v. Trinity Fruit Sales 
Co., 30 F. Supp. 3d 954 (E.D. Cal. 2014). 
39 See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] May 28, 2014 (Ger.), http://cisgw3.law 
.pace.edu/cases/140528g1.html. 
40 Tribunale [District Court] di Forli, 16 febbraio 2009 (It.), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 
090216i3.html. 
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CISG,41 as confirmed by the fact that Article 73 of the CISG deals with the 
consequences of a breach of such contracts. 
In many other instances, the interpretative extension of the 
Convention’s sphere of application ratione materiae beyond what is broadly 
accepted to be a contract of sale is more problematic and less accepted. 
In commercial practice, it is undeniable that business transactions, even 
when they keep the basic structure of a sale, increasingly involve some form 
of service or other obligations “to do” something (rather than merely “to 
give”). In particular, this change may be regarded as a result of the fact that 
modern trade not only calls for ready-made goods, but also for goods to be 
manufactured, and therefore by extension, for the “sale” of labor and 
services. The tendency to also consider as sales those contracts which require 
further activities besides the traditional exchange of goods with money goes 
back many years. That is why one cannot be surprised that the drafters of the 
CISG extended its applicability also to contracts which, under some domestic 
laws, are work contracts. Indeed, Article 3(1) of the CISG deals with the 
CISG’s applicability to contracts for the supply of goods to be manufactured 
or produced, whereas Article 3(2) of the CISG deals with contracts that 
include the supply of labor or other services amongst the obligations of the 
seller. Thus, the CISG contains some provisions which “confront the scholar 
with contractual schemes which have uncertain functional characteristics” 
and “which therefore raise the problem of whether such contracts fall under 
its sphere of application.” This is true, above all, in those cases where the 
seller is liable not only for the transfer of title and the delivery of the goods, 
but also for providing labor or services.42 It is also true for those cases where 
the buyer has to supply part of the materials needed for the production of the 
goods.43 
Among the contracts falling under the latter category are those for the 
supply of goods to be manufactured or produced. By analogizing these 
contracts to the more “classical” contracts for the sale of goods, the drafters 
of the CISG made clear that the sale of goods to be manufactured or produced 
is as much subject to the CISG as the sale of ready-made goods. Domestic 
                                                                                                                           
 
41 See Supreme Court of France, Jan. 12, 2016, http://www.globalsaleslaw.org/content/api/cisg/ 
display.cfm?test=2698. 
42 CISG, supra note 3, art. 3(2). 
43 Id. art. 3(1); see also FRANCO FERRARI & MARCO TORSELLO, INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: 
CISG IN A NUTSHELL 113–19 (2d ed. 2018). 
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peculiarities are irrelevant for the purposes of determining whether the CISG 
applies to the international sale of made-to-order goods. 
Under Article 3(1) of the CISG, contracts for the supply of goods to be 
manufactured or produced are, as a general rule, governed by the Convention. 
This conclusion is supported by the language of the provision, which states 
that “[c]ontracts for the sale of goods to be manufactured or produced are to 
be considered sales unless the party who orders the goods undertakes to 
supply a substantial part of the materials necessary for such manufacture or 
production.”44 Therefore, unless the exception applies, the rule confirms the 
applicability of the CISG to contracts for the supply of goods to be 
manufactured or produced.45 
The applicability of the CISG extends not only to contracts for the sale 
of made-to-order goods. Article 3(2) of the CISG also extends to contracts 
pursuant to which the seller undertakes to supply labor or other services 
alongside the obligations to deliver the goods, transfer the property and hand 
over the documents, as long as the supply of labor or services does not 
constitute the “preponderant part” of the seller’s obligation.46 
The criterion provided by the CISG to determine whether the 
Convention applies to contracts which imply the supply of goods, along with 
labor or services is “preponderance.” However, it is important to stress that 
the provision is drafted in negative terms. In other words, Article 3(2) of the 
CISG indicates the conditions under which the CISG does not apply, rather 
than indicating when it applies. Accordingly, the Convention seems to have 
a negative, exclusionary effect (providing guidance as to when the CISG does 
not apply), rather than the positive, conclusive effect as to the applicability 
of the CISG. 
Moreover, the notion of “preponderance” seems to justify the 
conclusion that not only must the quantity or importance of the labor or 
service-type of performance be greater than the sale-type of performance, but 
                                                                                                                           
 
44 GILLETTE & WALT, supra note 36, at 46 (describing this type of transaction as a form of 
“bailment for services”). 
45 As far as the determination of the concept of “substantial part” is concerned, it is suggested that 
one should not only use a quantitative criterion, but also a qualitative one, as suggested by the French 
version of the Convention (which reads “partie essentielle”), as well as by the comparison with Article 
3(2), which speaks of “preponderant part,” a concept referring to a quantitative determination. 
46 See PETER SCHLECHTRIEM & INGEBORG SCHWENZER, COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION 
ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 58 (Ingeborg Schwenzer ed., 2d ed. 2005). 
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it must be significantly greater in quantity or importance in order for the 
CISG to be excluded. 
The foregoing conclusion may offer important guidance beyond the 
scope of Article 3(2) of the CISG. In fact, it is posited here that Article 3(2) 
of the CISG expresses a general principle on “mixed contracts,” applicable 
in all circumstances where a contract provides for a type of exchange which 
is compatible with the typical sales contract’s exchange of goods for money, 
while at the same time providing for additional obligations which are usually 
absent in the stereotypical sales contract. 
A distinction must be made in this respect between severable and unified 
contracts, as the analysis that is being proposed is possible only with respect 
to unified (mixed) contracts.47 This view, in turn, requires one to determine 
how to decide whether the transaction is unified or severable. Although the 
Secretariat’s Commentary suggests that this question should be decided 
based on applicable domestic law,48 it is suggested here that the issue of the 
unitary or severable nature of the transaction must be dealt with on the basis 
of the Convention itself. This solution seems more in line with the mandate 
set forth in Article 7(1) of the CISG to promote the CISG’s uniform 
application. That said, it must be pointed out that the parties’ intention 
should, in any event, be taken as the guiding element to assess whether the 
contract is unified or severable. 
Article 3(2) of the CISG is thus deemed to provide guidance only in the 
event of a (single) mixed contract—that is, when the contract is to be treated 
as a single entity by virtue of the parties’ will or as a result of the objectively 
unitary economic function pursued by the parties. This conclusion, however, 
does not per se also imply that a single set of rules should apply to the entire 
unitary contract, according to a sort of “predominance” test. This approach, 
which reflects the approach common to many jurisdictions, is not satisfactory 
with respect to the CISG, because it does not take into due consideration the 
non-exhaustive character of the Convention, with which the rule under 
Article 3 of the CISG has to be coordinated. In particular, the non-exhaustive 
character of the CISG entails that a contract governed by the CISG may well 
be subject to the application of other sources of law with respect to issues 
                                                                                                                           
 
47 See id. at 58. 
48 See U.N. Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), Official Records: 
Documents of the Conference and Summary Records of the Plenary Meetings and of the Meetings of the 
Main Committees, 16–17, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/5 Part II (1991). 
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which are covered by the CISG. The (extensive) interpretation of the CISG 
may limit the need to resort to domestic law, but it cannot eliminate that need. 
If the CISG were an exhaustive piece of legislation, the statement that a 
contract is governed by the CISG could imply the exclusion of all concurrent 
sources. However, given the non-exhaustive character of the CISG, 
application merely implies that the CISG is applicable to the contract insofar 
as it contains rules dealing with the several contractual aspects relevant in a 
given case. However, when issues are at stake that are not governed by the 
CISG, the CISG itself instructs the interpreter to apply different law to the 
contract, either supranational (whenever a different instrument exists that 
deals with the issue not covered by the CISG), or domestic (whenever the 
CISG’s external gap is to be filled by resorting to the domestic law applicable 
by virtue of the private international law rules of the forum). 
What has just been said leads one to suggest a different reading of 
Article 3(2) of the CISG, dealing with mixed contracts. It is safe to assert 
(and in line with the traditional reading of the provision) that Article 3(2) of 
the CISG has a negative (exclusionary) implication, in that it excludes the 
application of the CISG when the “preponderant” part of the supplier’s 
obligations is constituted by the supply of “labour or other services.”49 The 
provision in question, however, cannot be deemed to also have a positive 
implication, in that the preponderance (or mere coexistence) of the supply of 
goods does not prevent—given the non-exhaustive character of the 
Convention—the severability of the contract and the concurrent application 
of different sources of law to the several obligations undertaken under the 
unitary contract. In short, the non-exhaustive character of the CISG makes 
the contractual dépeçage possible, and often necessary, in accordance to a 
sort of gravamen of the action test. By and large, nothing in Article 3(2) of 
the CISG (nor in any other CISG provision) prevents the concurrent 
application of the CISG to part of the contract (the part providing for sale-
type rights and obligations) and different sets of rules to other parts of the 
same contract (the parts relating to non-sale-type right and obligations). 
Moving along this line of thinking, one may reach the conclusion that 
whenever an international transaction (falling within the CISG’s sphere of 
application) requires one of the parties to perform sale-type obligations, it is 
                                                                                                                           
 
49 GILLETTE & WALT, supra note 36, at 61 (noting that the “preponderance” test should be based 
on economic standards). 
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appropriate to consider the possibility of subjecting those obligations to the 
CISG. 
B. The Applicability of the CISG Beyond Its Geographical Sphere of 
Application 
From a rather different perspective, a broader application of the CISG 
may result from taking the Convention into consideration in situations where 
the transaction at hand does not fall within its sphere of application. 
As a matter of fact, supranational commercial law is an incomplete 
puzzle of multiple, often uncoordinated pieces of legislation of different 
nature, origin and degree of normativity. Whenever the CISG happens to not 
be per se applicable to an international transaction, the most likely 
consequence is not that another international uniform law convention applies 
(given that the number of international uniform commercial law conventions 
is still relatively limited), but rather that a different, heterogeneous source of 
law applies, it being either the domestic law applicable by virtue of the 
private international law rules of the forum (a solution that supporters of the 
benefit of the international unification of commercial law view with disfavor) 
or a national general principles of law. 
This distinction reflects the difference between the “conflictualist” 
approach and the “internationalist” approach in the adjudication of 
international commercial disputes.50 In the latter context, it is not unlikely 
that the CISG may be resorted to as a source of legal rules in situations where 
it would not per se apply. In particular, this can result from: (a) the parties’ 
choice of the CISG as law applicable to their contract in cases where the 
Convention would not per se apply, (b) the resort to the CISG in the context 
of inter-conventional interpretation, when another convention is being 
applied, (c) the resort to the CISG as expression of general principles of 
contract law applicable also in non-sales transactions, or (d) the resort to the 
CISG as a source of the new lex mercatoria. 
Parties to an international contract not governed by the CISG may opt 
into the Convention, thus choosing it as the law applicable to their contractual 
                                                                                                                           
 
50 Friedrich K. Junger, The Lex Mercatoria and Private International Law, 5 UNIF. L. REV. 171 
(2000). 
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relationship.51 No one objects to the possibility of opting into the Convention, 
although in this the CISG is incorporated by reference as part of the terms of 
the contract, subject to application of the domestic law to be determined by 
virtue of the private international law rules of the forum. Opting-in may occur 
both when the requirements for the application of the CISG are not met and 
when the type of transaction in question does not qualify as a sale under the 
Convention. 
The need for inter-conventional interpretation, on the other hand, seems 
to be well-grounded in the text of international uniform law conventions, 
including the CISG and most subsequent conventions, and therefore fully 
justified in the light of the intention of the drafters of those conventions.52 I 
have argued elsewhere that the usefulness and effectiveness of inter-
conventional interpretation of uniform law stems from the fact that the 
various texts that were adopted after the CISG were drafted in accordance 
with a common and coherent unification strategy.53 On those grounds, it 
seems correct to conclude that notions and rules from the CISG, including 
the specific rules arising from the judicial application thereof, may be applied 
in the context of other international conventions, whose text is less clear, or 
which cannot rely on extensive scholarly writings and court decisions. 
Accordingly, just to provide a few examples, it is possible to resort to the 
notion of “place of business” drawn from scholarly writings commenting on 
Article 1 and 10 of the CISG54 when applying the corresponding provisions 
in subsequent conventions. Similarly, it is possible (and appropriate) to resort 
to the extensive case law under Article 25 of the CISG on fundamental 
breach55 when interpreting and applying the notion of “default” under Article 
11 of the UNIDROIT Cape Town Convention on International Interests in 
Mobile Equipment, especially in the event of application of the latter 
convention to a security interest (e.g., a retention of title clause) granted in 
the context of an international contract for the sale of goods. 
                                                                                                                           
 
51 Cf. PETER MANKOWSKI, Article 7 CISG, in COMMERCIAL LAW: ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE 
COMMENTARY § 15 (2019). 
52 F. FERRARI, I rapporti tra le convenzioni di diritto materiale uniforme in materia contrattuale e 
la necessità di un’interpretazione interconvenzionale, RIV. DIR. INT. PRIV. PROC. 669ff. (2000) 
(proposing the adoption of a methodology leading to inter-conventional interpretation). 
53 TORSELLO, supra note 4 passim. 
54 See SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 46, at 31–32. 
55 See Ulrich Magnus, Beyond the Digest: Part III (Articles 25–34, 45–52), in THE DRAFT 
UNCITRAL DIGEST AND BEYOND: CASES, ANALYSES AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES IN THE U.N. SALES 
CONVENTION 319, 320 (Franco Ferrari et al. eds., 2004). 
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In other circumstances the CISG is applied in situations where it would 
not per se be applicable and irrespective of the possible concurrence of any 
other convention and of any inter-conventional interpretation. In this type of 
case the CISG is resorted to as expression of general principles of contract 
law, which may exercise a persuasive influence on the adjudicator faced with 
contractual questions. Although this could potentially lead to the application 
of any provision of the CISG, it is more likely for this to happen with respect 
to the rules on the formation of contract (Articles 14–24 of the CISG), given 
the character of these rules as capable of being applied to any type of contract, 
as well as with respect to the general provisions relating to the sale of goods 
in general (Articles 25–29 of the CISG), or the provisions common to the 
obligations of the seller and of the buyer (Articles 71–88 of the CISG). To 
provide just one recent example of resort to the CISG in a case where the 
Convention was not per se applicable, one can refer to a recent decision 
rendered by the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (a state that has not 
ratified the CISG) regarding a dispute over a license agreement that contained 
a “No Oral Modification” (NOM) clause.56 In his opinion (with whom Lady 
Hale, Lord Wilson and Lord Lloyd-Jones agreed), Lord Sumption, after 
reviewing the position in other common law jurisdictions, including the 
United States and Australia, overruled the (partly unsettled) precedential 
English case law by referring primarily to Article 29 of the CISG, not only 
in regards to the general rule that “[a] contract in writing which contains a 
provision requiring any modification or termination by agreement to be in 
writing may not be otherwise modified or terminated by agreement,” but also 
in regards to the additional provision according to which “a party may be 
precluded by his conduct from asserting such a provision to the extent that 
the other party has relied on that conduct.” 
Extending further the possibility that the CISG be applied in cases where 
it would not per se be applicable, one must consider the situation where the 
Convention is applied as an expression of the new lex mercatoria. This 
phenomenon is likely to occur primarily (if not exclusively) in international 
commercial arbitration.57 In fact, this has been the case, for instance, where 
                                                                                                                           
 
56 Rock Advertising Limited v. MWB, [2018] UKSC 24, 2 WLR 1603. 
57 Cf. Jeffrey Waincymer, The CISG and International Commercial Arbitration: Promoting a 
Complimentary Relationship Between Substance and Procedure, in SHARING INTERNATIONAL 
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the CISG could not be applied because the contracts in question were 
concluded before the Convention entered into force.58 In other cases, 
however, what prevents the proper application of the CISG is not a temporal 
issue, but rather the fact that the transaction does not fall within the 
Convention’s sphere of application. In this case, the internationalist approach 
sometimes adopted in international commercial arbitration might justify 
seeking a solution through a comparative review of available supranational 
sources and the analysis of their respective persuasive strength. In this 
context, the CISG might be a very valuable source to resort to whenever the 
interpreter is seeking a balanced set of contract law provisions supported by 
extensive scholarly writings and case law and drafted with the view to 
producing a sound compromise between different national legal traditions. If 
one agrees that resort to the lex mercatoria by arbitral tribunals serves 
primarily the goal of avoiding application of the domestic law of either party, 
in the absence of an express choice, to avoid the impression that one party is 
being favored, one could easily agree that the contents of the lex mercatoria 
may be deduced from the text of the CISG, even in cases where the 
Convention does not per se apply, or where the contract is not a sales contract 
according to the Convention’s definition. 
III. APPLICATIONS OF THE CISG TO NON-SALES TRANSACTIONS: THE CASE 
OF COUNTERTRADE AND BARTER TRANSACTIONS 
After having identified the two most relevant approaches possibly 
leading to the expansion of the applicability of the CISG beyond its sphere 
of application, it is now appropriate to test the said approaches against the 
possibility of applying the Convention to non-sale transactions—that is, to 
contracts which are normally regarded and treated as separate from sales. The 
example that will be commented on hereafter is that of countertrade and 
barter transactions. 
Countertrade transactions are usually defined as a form of trade that 
involves the exchange of goods or services between two parties without (in 
                                                                                                                           
 
COMMERCIAL LAW ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES: FESTSCHRIFT FOR ALBERT H. KRITZER ON THE 
OCCASION OF HIS EIGHTIETH BIRTHDAY 582 (Camilla B. Andersen & Ulrich G. Schroeter eds., 2008). 
58 Case No. 5713 of 1989, 15 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 70 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.). 
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whole or in part) payment of money.59 The absence of a clear exchange of 
goods for money has often led commentators and courts to conclude that 
countertrade and barter transactions are not governed by the CISG.60 
It seems appropriate, however, to review this conclusion in light of the 
analysis that has thus far been conducted, and it should be noted that the 
notion of countertrade is often used to describe very different types of 
transaction, which have been used for different purposes at different times. 
Resort to barter transaction was common in cross-border trade with the 
Soviet Union and other socialist countries in the sixties and seventies.61 
Moreover, in the eighties, cases of Government-mandated countertrade were 
not isolated, especially in South America and Southeast Asia.62 A revival of 
barter transactions, however, has occurred in recent times (partly as a result 
of the financial crisis)63 and these types of transactions are now often resorted 
to by operators based in countries that rely on imports (in particular of 
technology) to offer a pay-back more attractive than their unstable local 
currencies.64 Moreover, to the extent that one believed that cryptocurrencies 
                                                                                                                           
 
59 See Ingeborg Schwenzer, Countertrade and the CISG, 9 INTERNATIONALES HANDELSRECHT 229 
(2009). 
60 See Case No. 91/2003, Trib. Int’l Com. Arb. of Russ. Fed’n. Chamber of Com. & Indus. (2004), 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040309r1.html. 
61 Cf. POMPILIU VERZARIU, COUNTERTRADE PRACTICES IN EAST EUROPE, THE SOVIET UNION AND 
CHINA: AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO BUSINESS (1980); RAZUMOV, Les contrats sur la base de 
compensation entre organisms soviétiques et firmes étrangères, in CLUNET 91 (1984). See William G. 
Frenkel & Michael Y. Sukhman, New Foreign Investment Regimes in Russia and Other Republics of the 
Former U.S.S.R.: A Legislative Analysis and Historical Perspective, 16 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 321 
(1993) (regarding the use of these types of contracts after the fall of the Soviet Union). 
62 See, for instance, the cases of Columbia (Decree No. 370 of 15 February 1984 on imports), 
Dominican Republic (Decree No. 2005 of 17 May 1984), Ecuador (Regulation No. 215 of December 11, 
1984). In South-East Asia, see, e.g., the case of Indonesia (Statute of April 8, 1983 on the execution of 
the connection between Government imports and non-oil exports). Cf. also WTO Secretariat, Trade Policy 
Review: Indonesia, at 48, WTO Doc. WT/TPR/S/117 (May 28, 2003). Cf. Terence P. Stewart & Margaret 
L. H. Png, The Growth Triangle of Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, 23 GEORGIA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
59 (1993). Also, in Thailand for some time the Government imposed on foreign companies the counter-
purchase of national Thai commodities for a value of at least 50% of the main contract. Cf. OFFICE OF THE 
PRIME MINISTER, Regulation on Countertrade, B.E. 2543 (2000). See also WTO Secretariat, Trade Policy 
Review: Thailand, at 51, WTO Doc. WT/TPR/S/123 (Oct. 15, 2003). 
63 See Schwenzer, supra note 59, at 230 (reviewing recent countertrade transactions). 
64 Cf. George A. Zaphiriou, Unification and Harmonization of Law Relating to Global and Regional 
Trading, 14 N. ILL. UNIV. L. REV. 407, 412 (1994); ACEO (ASSOCIATION POUR LA COMPENSATION DES 
ECHANGES COMMERCIAUX), GUIDE PRATIQUE DE LA COMPENSATION (2003); A. COACCIOLI, Gli scambi 
in compensazione, IL DIRITTO PRIVATO NELLA GIURISPRUDENZA. I NUOVI CONTRATTI NELLA PRASSI 
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do not qualify as money, one would conclude that a sale of goods in which 
cryptocurrency is the form of payment is not a sale, but rather a barter 
transaction—a solution which may leave many commentators unsatisfied. 
Notwithstanding some criticism, including that expressed by 
authoritative entities such as FMI, WTO and OECD (who emphasize the 
possible anti-competitive effects),65 many commentators look at barter 
transactions favorably. A positive view of these transactions, in particular, is 
offered by the UNCITRAL Legal Guide on International Countertrade 
Transactions adopted in 199266 which deals extensively with these types of 
transactions. 
The Legal Guide definition of countertrade transactions is based on the 
link between obligations exchanged by the parties. Accordingly, countertrade 
transactions are “those transactions in which one party supplies goods, 
services, technology or other economic value to the second party, and, in 
return, the first party purchases from the second party an agreed amount of 
goods, services, technology or other economic value.”67 This definition is 
very broad, in that it is merely based on the absence, in whole or in part, of a 
payment obligation. However, it is also a definition capable of shedding light 
on a critical aspect of these types of transactions, in that it requires a 
determination of whether the transaction is the result of separate contacts, 
which are contracts linked to one another by virtue of the will of the parties, 
a result of their functional connection, or of a unitary (possibly mixed) 
contract. 
Therefore, the first problem raised by these types of transactions is 
whether the exchange is performed by a single contract or two separate, 
although linked, contracts. The solution, of course, should first be based on 
the will of the parties. However, in some cases resort to the will of the parties 
may prove ambiguous so that the interpreter will need to refer (additionally 
or exclusively) to the unitary function of the transaction and the objective 
                                                                                                                           
 
CIVILE E COMMERCIALE. XI. FIGURE DELLA CONTRATTAZIONE INTERNAZIONALE 487 (P. CENDON ed., 
2004). 
65 Cf. Jerzy Rajski, Some Legal Aspects of International Compensation Trade, 35 INT’L COMP. L. 
Q. 128 (1986). 
66 U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW [UNCITRAL], LEGAL GUIDE ON INTERNATIONAL 
COUNTERTRADE TRANSACTIONS, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.B/3, U.N. Sales No. E.93.V.7 (1993) 
[hereinafter UNCITRAL Legal Guide]; see James C. Nobles, Jr. & Johannes Lang, The UNCITRAL Legal 
Guide on International Countertrade Transactions: The Foundation for a New Era in Countertrade?, 30 
INT’L L. 739 (1996) (commenting on the Legal Guide). 
67 UNCITRAL Legal Guide, supra note 66, at 6. 
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connection between the obligations exchanged. Accordingly, the interpreter 
needs to determine whether the transaction qualifies as a unitary and 
indissoluble transaction for the exchange of goods or services, or as a “double 
sale” (Doppelkauf), with respect to which each one of the two sales is capable 
of autonomous consideration and of independent performance, and likely to 
be governed by the CISG, provided that the other conditions for the 
application of the Convention are met. 
In fact, whenever the countertrade transaction is the result of a “double 
sale,” which entails the subsequent set-off of the corresponding payment 
obligations,68 there is no reason to exclude the application of the CISG to all 
aspects of the transactions which are capable of being governed by the CISG, 
including, in particular, the reciprocal obligations to deliver goods and the 
consequences of the breach thereof. This conclusion is not affected by the 
fact that the CISG does not govern the set-off of reciprocal payment 
obligations, which will be governed by the domestic rules applicable by 
virtue of the private international law rules of the forum. 
At times, however, the parties intend to make each delivery obligation 
strictly conditional upon the performance of the corresponding counter-
delivery. In this scheme, the price of each performance, if at all indicated, is 
indicated as a mere measurement of the value of the goods to be exchanged, 
often for purposes unrelated with the exchange itself (e.g., insurance, 
customs declaration and clearance, etc.). 
Keeping the foregoing in mind, it seems appropriate to proceed in the 
analysis by taking into account separately the different types of transactions 
identified in the UNCITRAL Legal Guide as falling within the broad notion 
of countertrade transaction,69 although it should be noted that in most cases, 
irrespective of the type of transaction in question, the exchange takes the 
form of a preliminary framework agreement followed by separate 
agreements for the reciprocal delivery of goods.70 
(i) Under a buy-back transaction (achat en retour in French, 
Produktabnahme in German), the importer of technology (and related 
equipment) pays (in part) the purchase price by means of the delivery of 
                                                                                                                           
 
68 Cf. J.E. Elenbaas & J.G. Kreuze, International Countertrade: Is It a Sale Yet?, CPA J. 66 (1992). 
69 Cf. Jean-Francois Hennart, Some Empirical Dimensions of Countertrade, 21 J. INT’L BUS. ST. 
243 (1990). 
70 Paul Mishkin, Countertrade and Barter: The Basic Legal Structure, 14 INT’L BUS. L. 7 (1986). 
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goods manufactured or produced by means of the acquired technology.71 In 
a buy-back transaction, the reciprocal obligations of the parties are always 
expressed in monetary value. The supplier/exporter supplies technology and 
related equipment of a certain value, while agreeing to accept in return (as 
partial consideration for the goods and technology supplied) goods 
manufactured or produced by means of the technology, which the importer 
undertakes to sell back to the exporter under a “most favoured customer” or 
“preference” clause.72 
According to the UNCITRAL Legal Guide, a “buy-back” transaction 
refers to a transaction in which one party supplies a production facility, and the 
parties agree that the supplier of the facility, or a person designated by the supplier, 
will buy products resulting from that production facility. The supplier of the 
facility often provides technology and training and sometimes component parts or 
materials to be used in the production. The supply of a production facility usually 
requires bank financing.73 
Given the role played in a buy-back transaction by the transfer of technology, 
the supply of training and the possible supply of parts or materials to be used 
in the manufacture or production of goods, whether or not the back-sale of 
products by the importer is governed by the CISG, is to be determined in 
accordance with Article 3(1) of the Convention, whereas the nature of the 
counter-performance rendered by the back-purchaser does not create a 
problem, given its monetary character. In many (possibly most) cases Article 
3(1) of the CISG will lead to the exclusion of the Convention, due to the 
“essential” character of the technology transferred to the back-seller. 
However, if a different conclusion is reached with regard to the essential 
nature of the transfer of technology, there is no impediment to the application 
of the CISG, to the extent that the other criteria of application are met and to 
the extent that the CISG provides rules suitable to be used to govern the 
various aspect of the transaction. 
The foregoing is without prejudice to the possible concurrence of 
different sources of law applicable to aspects of the transaction which are not 
                                                                                                                           
 
71 Cf. LIANA FADDA, IL COUNTERTRADE: ASPETTI ECONOMICO-AZIENDALI 23 (1988); ANTONIO 
FOGLIO, COUNTERTRADE E COMMERCIO ESTERO 2000: STRATEGIE E TECNICHE DEGLI SCAMBI IN 
COMPENSAZIONE 60 (1996); HANS VAN HOUTTE, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 345 (2d ed. 2002). 
72 CLIVE M. SCHMITTHOFF, SCHMITTOFF’S EXPORT TRADE: THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 276 (C. Murray et al. eds., 12th ed. 2012). 
73 UNCITRAL LEGAL GUIDE, supra note 66, at 9. 
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governed by the CISG, such as in the case of royalties payable for the license 
of technology. 
(ii) Under a counter-purchase transaction (“contre-achat” in French, 
“Gegenkauf” in German), the counter-performance of the (importing) 
purchaser is effected partly in cash and partly (according to the counter-
purchase ratio) through the counter-sale of different goods. 
According to the UNCITRAL Legal Guide, the notion of “counter-
purchase” 
is used to refer to a transaction in which the parties, in connection with the 
conclusion of a purchase contract in one direction, enter into an agreement to 
conclude a sales contract in the other direction, i.e., a counter-purchase contract. 
Counter-purchase is distinguished from buy-back in that the goods supplied under 
the first purchase are not used in the production of the items sold in return.74 
Under the reported definition it is apparent that the counter-purchase 
transaction is characterized as the combination of two linked sales 
transactions, both of which may be subject to the CISG, provided that the 
other criteria of application of the Convention are met. In fact, although both 
contracts aim at pursuing the same economic function, the parties treat them 
as capable of being considered distinctly75 and the Legal Guide specifies that 
“when the parties wish to avoid the interdependence of obligations between 
the export contract and the countertrade agreement, or when they wish to 
limit interdependence to particular obligations, it is advisable that they 
embody the export contract and the countertrade agreement in separate 
instruments.”76 
The foregoing conclusion, in particular the conclusion that counter-
purchase transactions are governed by the CISG, is not affected by the fact 
that counter-purchases sometimes contain provisions which are not covered 
by the CISG, such as clauses limiting access to certain markets or posing 
quantitative limitations in those markets. Indeed, these clauses are not 
infrequent, as they serve the importer’s interest to protect its output markets. 
Their presence, however, is not per se conclusive of an overall function of 
                                                                                                                           
 
74 Id. 
75 The separation may also, at times, serve as a tax of monetary control purposes. Cf. G.C. 
MARCHESI, GUIDA AGLI SCAMBI IN COMPENSAZIONE 100 (2d ed. 1986). 
76 UNCITRAL Legal Guide, supra note 66, at 17. 
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the transaction incompatible with the application of the CISG to the sales-
type obligations. 
A peculiar type of counter-purchase occurs when the importer of 
products, equipment and technology requires the exporter to purchase for 
manufacturing purposes or for incorporation in the final products goods, 
materials or components by the importer of by third parties in the importer’s 
country. This transaction, which is at times qualified as offset,77 serves the 
purpose of facilitating the development of the importer’s country’s industry, 
thus reducing the latter’s technological dependence. 
Whether or not an offset transaction may be governed by the CISG 
depends largely on the review of the reciprocal obligations in light of Article 
3(1) of the CISG, keeping in mind that the transaction results, in most cases, 
from the combination of two separate, although linked, contracts for the sale 
of goods. 
(iii) Under a barter transaction (“troc” in French, “Tauschgeschäft” in 
German) the parties trade goods exclusively for other goods.78 
Although according to the UNCITRAL Legal Guide, “in practice the 
term ‘barter’ is used with different meanings,”79 this notion is used here to 
refer to transactions that involve trade without money,80 or with a limited use 
of money, for the sole purpose of value adjustment.81 In many instances it 
may be difficult to distinguish a barter transaction from a commercial 
compensation (also known as compensation deal, or contrat de 
compensation), which is characterized by the fact that the exchange results 
from a single contract and the counter-performance is partly in goods and 
partly in money.82 
                                                                                                                           
 
77 Cf. Schwenzer, supra note 59, at 230. 
78 Richard E. Caves & Dalia Marin, Countertrade Transactions: Theory and Evidence, 102 ECON. 
J. 1171 (1992). 
79 UNCITRAL Legal Guide, supra note 66, at 8. 
80 See, Mishkin, supra note 70, at 7 (“Pure barter transactions involve trade without money; 
moreover, in pure barter transactions the parties always trade directly with each other and consequently 
each party to a transaction must want what the other party offers.”). For a specific use of barter transactions 
in advertising contracts, see, M. Fusi, Considerazioni sul contratto di bartering pubblicitario, RIV. DIR. 
IND. 133 (2007). 
81 Laura B. Forker, Purchasing’s Views on Countertrade, 28 INT’L J. OF PURCHASING & 
MATERIALS MGMT. 10 (1992). 
82 Cf. COACCIOLI, supra note 64, at 494. 
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The need for money adjustment, however, may be a relevant hint as to 
the actual intention pursued by the parties and, ultimately, as to the (possibly 
different) type of barter transaction that the parties envisaged. 
In fact, many commentators observe that two different types of barter 
exist83: in the pure (non-adjusted) barter transaction (also referred to as “first 
generation” barter84) the exchange occurs between goods irrespective of their 
objective economic value and, therefore, without need for a money 
adjustment.85 Under these circumstances, some commentators and arbitral 
decisions have denied the possibility to apply the CISG as a result of their 
holding that the CISG requires necessarily a monetary payment as “price” of 
the sale.86 Alternatively, parties may enter into a (“second generation”) 
adjusted barter only after having attributed an economic value to the goods 
to be exchanged and usually provide that the difference in value be equalized 
by virtue of the payment of a sum of money corresponding to the difference 
in value. 
To the extent that the barter transaction implies an assessment of the 
value of the goods to be exchanged and an adjustment in money of the 
difference in value (that is, to the extent that it is a “second generation” 
barter), the conclusion should be that the CISG may apply to the transaction, 
as long as the other requirements for application are met. This is the case 
even if the monetary payment represents merely the adjustment of the 
difference in value of the parties’ performances rather than the “price” of the 
most valuable performance. In fact, it is apparent that the parties have agreed 
on the attribution of a value, and therefore, of a “price” to the goods 
exchanged, whereas there would be no reason to maintain that the 
Convention necessarily requires the price to be paid in money87 where the 
parties have agreed that the price would be paid otherwise—namely, by an 
adjusted barter transaction. 
This solution may also be applied in the event of an international sale of 
goods providing for payment by means of cryptocurrency, irrespective of the 
                                                                                                                           
 
83 Cf. Nigel M. Healey, A Beginner’s Guide to Corporate Barter, 48 ILL. BUS. REV. 13 (1991). 
84 See MARCHESI, supra note 75, at 26. 
85 SCHMITTHOFF, supra note 72, at 275. 
86 Cf. Franco Ferrari, The CISG’s Sphere of Application: Articles 1–3 and 10, THE DRAFT 
UNCITRAL DIGEST AND BEYOND 21, 63–64 (Franco Ferrari et al. eds. 2004); Tribunal of International 
Commercial Arbitration at the Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Mar. 9, 2004, 
Case No. 91/2003, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040309r1.html. 
87 See also GILLETTE & WALT, supra note 36, at 56. 
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characterization of cryptocurrencies as money. In fact, in the situation in 
question, it is undeniable that the parties attribute an economic value to the 
goods to be exchanged and, by virtue of their freedom of contract under 
Article 6 of the CISG, they agree to use cryptocurrency as a substitute for 
money providing consideration for the exact value of the goods purchased. 
Conversely, notwithstanding the fact that the individual obligation to 
deliver goods under a barter transaction corresponds to the obligation to 
deliver goods under a sales transaction, the prevailing view regarding “first 
generation” barter transactions is in the sense that they are not governed by 
the CISG.88 
This conclusion, however, does not per se preclude the possibility to 
refer to the CISG as a source of general principles of law governing “delivery 
of goods” in general, thus applicable also to a “first generation” barter 
transaction. In support of this conclusion is the fact that, in the absence of 
application of the CISG, the matter would not be subjected to an alternative 
instrument of international uniform commercial law, but rather to the 
domestic law applicable by virtue of the private international law rules of the 
forum.89 Somewhat paradoxically, most national domestic rules would end 
up referring to the domestic law of sales as the primary source of rules 
applicable to the delivery of the products and all other sale-type obligations. 
This being the alternative, it is apparent that it would be all but absurd or 
inappropriate to support, instead, the application of the CISG, at least to 
obligations, such as the delivery obligation, which are structurally identical 
to the corresponding obligation in a sales contract. 
This application of the CISG, however, is not supported by the 
interpretation of the Convention’s sphere of application ratione materiae, but 
rather by a radically different approach to the identification of the law 
applicable to international business transactions. In contrast, the traditional 
(conflictualist) approach to the problem would lead to the conclusion that a 
“first generation” barter is too profoundly different from the scheme of 
exchange of goods for a price to justify the application of the CISG, and that 
                                                                                                                           
 
88 Cf. B. Piltz, New Developments Under the CISG, 11 VINDOBONA J. INT’L COMM. L. & ARB. 135 
(2007); for an arbitral award excluding the applicability of the CISG to barter transactions, see Tribunal 
of International Commercial Arbitration at the Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 
Feb. 19, 2004, Case No. 65/2003, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040219r1.html. 
89 See also Schwenzer, supra note 59, at 232. 
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the transaction must be subjected to the domestic law applicable by virtue of 
the private international law rules of the forum. 
IV. CLOSING REMARKS 
The analysis that has been carried out has taken the view that the 
interpretation of the CISG must consider the general socio-political context 
in which the Convention is applied. This position, however, should not be 
misunderstood. In fact, even in the current state of the world, notwithstanding 
the wave of neo-souverainisme that seems to be expanding globally, and 
notwithstanding the shift of attention of uniform law-making agencies from 
hard law treaties and conventions to soft law instruments, the reasons 
supporting the need for a broad interpretation and expansive application of 
the CISG still deserve full support. 
Accordingly, it has been posited that in the interpretation of the CISG 
an expansive approach should be favored, aimed at broadening the sphere of 
application of the Convention ratione materiae beyond the rigid limits of 
what are qualified as sales contracts under many domestic laws. Similarly, 
the application of the Convention should be favored in cases where the CISG 
would not per se be applicable, in light of its limited sphere of application 
from a temporal or geographical point of view. This, in particular, may be 
the result of the parties’ opting-in; an inter-conventional interpretation in 
cases where different uniform law instruments apply; resort to the CISG as a 
persuasive source of general principles of international contract law; or of the 
new lex mercatoria. 
As an example of actual application of the CISG beyond sales contracts, 
it has been posited that the CISG may be applied to counter-trade 
transactions, although a distinction has been made between different types of 
contracts that are usually referred to as countertrade or barter. In general 
counter-trade and barter transactions may be governed by the CISG, not only 
when the exchange of goods is preceded by a precise determination of the 
respective values of the exchanged goods (and adjustment payments are 
provided to equalize the value of the performances), but also when the 
transaction is truly intended to take the form of an exchange of goods. Unlike 
in the former case, however, in the latter one this conclusion can be reached 
only by referring to the CISG as the source of persuasive supranational 
principles on delivery of goods and other relevant aspects of the transaction 
to be applied in the case at hand, an approach which may prove particularly 
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complicated before national courts, which are bound to adopt a conflictualist 
approach leading to the application of the national law identified by virtue of 
the private international law rules of the forum. 
